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The military historian William H. McNeill opens his 1995 book Keeping 
Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History with a personal anecdote. 
In 1941, he was drafted into the U.S. army and sent to Texas for basic 
training. This involved a great deal of marching about and drilling on a 
dusty patch of the Texas plain. All concerned realized that this exercise 
was utterly useless given the facts of twentieth-century warfare, yet McNeill 
(1995) recalls the following:
Marching aimlessly about on the drill field, swaggering in conformity with pre-
scribed military postures, conscious only of keeping in step so as to make the next 
move correctly and in time somehow felt good.… A sense of pervasive well-being 
is what I recall; more specifically, a strange sense of personal enlargement; a sort of 
swelling out, becoming bigger than life, thanks to participation in collective ritual. 
(p. 2)
McNeill also points out the similarity of what he experienced to what 
happens in traditional communal dancing:
“Boundary loss” is the individual and “feeling they are one” is the collective way 
of looking at the same thing: a blurring of self-awareness and the heightening of 
fellow-feeling with all who share in the dance. It matches my own recollection of 
what close-order drill felt like… (p. 8)
In these two examples of close-order drill and communal dancing, the joint 
action seems to bring participants a heightened sense of agency and a sense 
of we-ness at the expense of a well-defined sense of self. However, is this 
phenomenology characteristic of all joint actions? This is rather unlikely, 
given that joint actions come in a great variety of forms.
One can distinguish at least six relevant dimensions of variation in joint 
action. One concerns the number of participants involved in the joint 
action, from two at a minimum up to several million, as happened, for 
instance, in 2002 and 2003 with the huge street protests in many countries 
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against the war in Iraq. A second dimension of variation concerns the more 
or less egalitarian versus hierarchical relationships among the participating 
agents. A third dimension of variation concerns the extent and form of 
the division of labor among coagents and thus the extent to which the 
roles they play are specialized rather than interchangeable. A fourth dimen-
sion of variation concern the nature of the interactions among partici-
pants, from purely virtual interactions, as in modern forms of telecommuting 
to work, to highly physical ones, as in communal dancing and close-order 
drill. A fifth relevant dimension concerns the transient versus long-term 
nature of the association formed by the participants. Two people who 
jointly help an old lady get up after she falls in the middle of the street 
may never have met before and may never meet again. In contrast, two 
acrobats who do a joint number may have trained together for years. 
Finally, some joint actions depend on complex institutions and involve 
activities heavily regulated by norms while others do not.
It is important to note also that while large-scale, long-term, hierarchical 
organization and institutional structure are features that tend to co-occur, 
their co-occurrence is not necessary, and these dimensions are at least 
partially independent. Thus, although the landing of the Allies in Nor-
mandy in 1944 was indeed a very large-scale joint action, involving over 
156,000 troops, the participants of which acted as part of the epitome of 
hierarchical institutions, the military, and with a clear division of labor, 
other large-scale joint actions such as street protests don’t have these 
features.
This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenology of joint action 
and at gaining a better understanding of (1) how the sense of agency one 
experiences when engaged in a joint action differs from the sense of agency 
one has for individual actions and (2) how the sense of agency one experi-
ences when engaged in a joint action differs according to the type of joint 
action and to the role one plays in it. In recent years, there has been a 
surge of interest in the phenomenology of individual action, and there is 
now considerable evidence that the sense of agency we experience for an 
individual action relies on a multiplicity of cues related to different levels 
of action specification and control. If the same principle holds for joint 
actions—that is, if the same kinds of relations hold between mechanisms 
of action specification and control and mechanisms involved in the gen-
eration of the sense of agency—then, to get a better grip on the phenom-
enology of joint action, we need to know how the mechanisms of action 
specification and control involved in joint action differ from those involved 
in individual action. We also need to know how these mechanisms may 
8841_014.indd   344 7/28/2011   8:34:19 PM
Seemann—Joint Attention
The Phenomenology of Joint Action 345
differ according to the type of joint action under consideration. For that, 
in turn, we need to understand what specific requirements bear on joint 
actions as opposed to individual actions or to one type of joint action as 
opposed to another.
In the next section (“The Sense of Agency for Individual Actions: Sources 
and Mechanisms”), I offer a brief survey of recent, complementary models 
of how and where in the cognitive architecture the sense of agency is 
generated, pointing out the relations they draw between action specifica-
tion and control mechanisms and processes involved in the generation of 
the sense of agency. Next, in the third section (“Small-Scale Joint Actions”) 
and fourth section (“Beyond Small-Scale, Egalitarian Actions”), I discuss 
the specific requirements that bear on joint action—in particular, the 
requirements concerning the coordination of participants’ actions with 
respect to their joint goal—and the cognitive mechanisms needed to ensure 
that these requirements are met. To keep things manageable, I only distin-
guish between two broad types of joint action: small-scale, egalitarian joint 
actions, discussed in the third section, and larger-scale, hierarchical joint 
actions, discussed in the fourth section. With the ground thus prepared, I 
plunge into the heart of the matter in the fifth section (“The Sense of 
Agency for Joint Actions”), where I discuss the factors influencing the 
strength or intensity of the sense of agency one experiences when engaged 
in joint action, the extent to which agency is experienced as joint agency, 
and whether it is at the expense of a sense of self-agency.
The Sense of Agency for Individual Actions: Sources and Mechanisms
Empirical research on (individual) agency has explored a number of poten-
tial cues to agency, and different cognitive models for agency have been 
proposed, ranging from high-level cognitive mechanisms to low-level 
sensorimotor mechanisms.
Some authors have tended to focus on high-level cognitive mechanisms, 
invoking a “central” interpretive system to explain our awareness of our 
own agency. According to this approach, the sense of agency is subserved 
by a holistic mechanism that is concerned with narrative self-understand-
ing. Our sense of what, if anything, we are up to is based on the operations 
of a high-level integrative process that draws on the agent’s self-conception 
and tries to put the best spin on things that it can. Such a conception has 
strong Dennettian overtones. We turn Dennett’s intentional stance inward 
and treat ourselves as entities whose behavior needs to be made sense of 
in light of an implicit theory of ideal agency.
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Many authors have expressed some sympathy with, and in some cases 
whole-hearted commitment to, the narrative approach. Interpreting split-
brain studies in light of Dennettian (Dennett, 1992) themes concerning 
the role of narrative in self-interpretation, Roser and Gazzaniga (2004, 
2006) have argued that the left hemisphere contains an interpreter, whose 
job it is to make sense of the agent’s own behavior. The psychologist Louis 
Sass has suggested that schizophrenic patients with delusions of alien 
control no longer feel as though they are in control of their actions because 
“particular thoughts and actions may not make sense in relation to the 
whole” (Sass, 1992, p. 214), and Stephens and Graham (2000) have further 
developed his proposal. Peter Carruthers (2007) suggests that 
our awareness of our own will results from turning our mind-reading capacities upon 
themselves, and coming up with the best interpretation of the information that is 
available to it—where this information doesn’t include those acts of deciding them-
selves, but only the causes and effects of those events. (p. 199)
Holistic themes also play an important role in Daniel Wegner’s influen-
tial treatment of agentive self-awareness (Wegner, 2002, 2005). On the one 
hand, Wegner argues that the sense of agency is typically inferred from 
the existence of a match between a prior thought and an observed action, 
where the thought occurs just before the action, the thought is consistent 
with the action, and other potential causes of the actions are not present. 
On the other hand, he also notes that we perform many actions without 
the benefit of such previews, and he suggests, “Even when we didn’t know 
what we were doing in advance, we may trust our theory that we con-
sciously will our actions and so find ourselves forced to imagine or con-
fabulate memories of ‘prior’ consistent thoughts” (Wegner, 2002, p. 146).
A wide array of evidence can be marshaled in support of this high-level 
account. When young children happen to achieve a goal by luck, they will 
say that they had intended the action that yielded that goal all along (Phil-
lips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1998). Split-brain subjects are prone to con-
fabulate accounts of actions that are generated by their right hemisphere 
(Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978). Data from subjects in altered states of con-
sciousness also support the narrative approach. For example, bizarre behav-
iors performed in response to hypnotic suggestion are often accompanied 
by elaborate rationalizations and confabulations on the part of the agents 
(Moll, 1889). Finally, this approach derives support from a number of labo-
ratory studies with normal subjects, in which it has been shown that the 
sense of agency can be modulated by priming and by various contextual 
parameters (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winer-
man, 2004; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).
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In contrast to this high-level approach, a number of researchers have 
proposed that the monitoring of action execution is crucial for agency and 
that the sense of agency is generated by low-level mechanisms that exploit 
performance-related sensorimotor cues.
Tsakiris and colleagues have investigated the possibility that efferent 
signals sent to the motor system while implementing an intention provide 
such cues. In particular, they have proposed that efferent signals are used 
to generate accurate temporal and kinematic predictions about how and 
when particular body parts should move (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Tsaki-
ris, Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 2005; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 
2006). In support of that claim, they have demonstrated that self-recogni-
tion of one’s own bodily movements crucially depends on efferent signals.
Another line of evidence for the role of efferent signals in generating a 
sense of agency involves “intentional binding,” a phenomenon in which 
self-produced movements and their effects are perceived as being closer 
together in subjective time than they actually are (Haggard & Clark, 2003; 
Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). More specifically, when a voluntary 
act (e.g., a button press) causes an effect (e.g., a tone), the action is per-
ceived by the agent as having occurred later than it did, and the effect is 
perceived as having occurred earlier. In contrast, when similar movements 
and auditory effects occur involuntarily rather than voluntarily, the 
binding effect is reversed and cause and effect are perceived as further apart 
in time than they actually are. The phenomenon of intentional binding 
suggest that the sense of agency is constructed at the time of the action 
itself, that it exploits efferent signals and is an immediate by-product of 
the motor control circuits that generate and control the physical 
movement.
Another mechanism appeals to internal forward models used for action 
control (Blakemore & Frith, 2003; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000a, 
2000b). According to this proposal, forward models are fed an efference 
copy of actual motor commands and compute estimates of the sensory 
consequences of the ensuing movements. The predicted sensory conse-
quences are compared with actual sensory feedback (reafferences). When 
there is a match between predicted and actual state, the comparator sends 
a signal to the effect that the sensory changes are self-generated, and when 
there is no match (or an insufficiently robust match), sensory changes are 
coded as externally caused. Indirect evidence for this model comes from 
studies demonstrating that discrepancies between predictions and sensory 
reafferences affect tactile sensations (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; 
Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000) and visual perception of one’s own 
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actions (Leube et al., 2003). Direct evidence is also provided by studies 
demonstrating that agency is gradually reduced as these discrepancies 
increase due to spatial deviations and temporal delays (Fourneret & Jean-
nerod, 1998; Knoblich & Kircher, 2004; Knoblich, Stottmeister, & Kircher, 
2004; Leube et al., 2003; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; van den Bos & Jeannerod, 
2002).
However, as several authors have pointed out (Gallagher, 2007; 
Knoblich & Repp, 2009; Pacherie, 2008), the results of some of these 
studies are open to alternative interpretations in terms of perceptual rather 
than sensorimotor cues. It is well-known that we have little awareness 
of the proprioceptive feedback associated with movements or even of the 
corrections we make during goal-directed movements (de Vignemont, 
Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2006; Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998). Indeed, passive 
movements are associated with more activity in the secondary somato-
sensory cortex than active movements (Weiller et al., 1996). Frith (2005) 
even suggests that lack of proprioceptive experience may be one indicator 
that one is performing a voluntary act. The vast majority of our actions 
aim at producing effects in the environment, and we normally attend to 
the perceptual effects of our movements rather than to the movements 
themselves. It may therefore be that perceptual cues rather than senso-
rimotor cues are crucial to the sense of agency. Direct evidence for this 
view comes from an experiment of Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998) where 
subjects are instructed to move a stylus on a graphic tablet on a straight 
line to a visual target. Subjects cannot see their drawing hand, only its 
trajectory, visible as a line on a computer screen. However, the experi-
menter introduces a directional bias electronically so that the visible 
trajectory no longer corresponds to that of the hand. When the bias is 
small (less than 14 degrees), subjects make automatic adjustments of their 
hand movements to reach the target but remain unaware that they are 
making these corrections. It is with larger biases that subjects become 
aware of a discrepancy and begin to use conscious monitoring of their 
hand movement to correct for it and to reach the target. These results 
suggest that although discrepancies between predicted and actual sensory 
feedback are detected at some level since they are used to make appropri-
ate corrections of the hand movement, they do not influence the sense 
of agency. Rather, subjects’ sense of agency for the action seems to rely 
mostly on a comparison of the predicted and actual perceptual conse-
quences of their action. As long as the trajectory seen on the screen 
matches sufficiently well the predicted trajectory, proprioceptive informa-
tion is ignored.
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Further evidence that perceptual cues may contribute more to the sense 
of agency than sensorimotor cues comes from pathologies (Jeannerod, 
2009). For instance, patients with schizophrenia are impaired in explicitly 
judging whether they are in control of perceptual events but not impaired 
in automatically compensating for sensorimotor transformations between 
their movements and the resulting perceptual events (Fourneret et al., 
2002). Frontal patients, like patients with schizophrenia, have a preserved 
automatic sensorimotor control, contrasting with impaired action aware-
ness and conscious monitoring (Slachevsky et al., 2003).
All the models I briefly reviewed share a core idea. They appeal to a 
principle of congruence between anticipated outcome and actual outcome. 
Where they differ is on whether the cues used are primarily cognitive, 
perceptual, or sensorimotor. There is now, however, a growing consensus 
that these different models should be seen as complementary rather than 
as rival and that the sense of agency relies on a multiplicity of cues coming 
from different sources (Bayne & Pacherie, 2007; Gallagher, 2007; Knoblich 
& Repp, 2009; Pacherie, 2008; Sato, 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 
2008). Thus, the conceptual framework I proposed (Pacherie, 2008), dis-
tinguishes between three hierarchically ordered intentional levels: (1) 
distal intentions, where the action to be performed (i.e., goals and means) 
is specified in cognitive terms, (2) proximal intentions, where it is speci-
fied in actional–perceptual terms, that is, in terms of the action schemas 
to be implemented and the perceptual events that will occur as a conse-
quence, and (3) motor intentions, where it is specified in sensorimotor 
terms. As this model distinguishes between distal (D), proximal (P), and 
motor (M) intentions, I call it the DPM model, Comparisons of desired, 
predicted, and actual states at each of these three levels provide different 
cues to agency.
At present, these integrative frameworks still leave open a number of 
questions regarding the relative weight of different agency cues and the 
extent to which this weight can be modulated by the nature of the task, 
the attentional state of the agent, or the agent’s level of expertise. To 
answer those questions, further empirical investigations are needed. 
However, these integrative frameworks all agree that the various cues 
exploited in generating the sense of agency for an action are signals and 
representations typically produced by action specification and control 
mechanisms and processes.
In what follows, I am assuming that the same kind of relationship 
holds for joint action, that is, that the sense of agency we experience for 
joint action is largely based on cues produced by the mechanisms of 
8841_014.indd   349 7/28/2011   8:34:20 PM
Seemann—Joint Attention
350 Elisabeth Pacherie
action specification and control at play in joint action. Thus, if we want 
to understand how the phenomenology of joint action differs from the 
phenomenology of individual action, we need to understand how the 
mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action 
differ from those involved in individual action. To understand that, in 
turn, we need to investigate what specific requirements bear on joint 
actions as opposed to individual actions or one type of joint action as 
opposed to another. To this task I now turn, starting with small-scale joint 
actions.
Small-Scale Joint Actions
In the broadest sense, the label “collective actions” can be used as a 
generic term to cover all cases where a certain global effect is the result 
of the actions of several individuals. Creating a traffic jam is a collective 
action in this sense, as a single motorist alone in the streets could not 
create a traffic jam. This is a collective action in the weakest possible 
sense since it is not even required that the participating agents have the 
goal to produce that outcome, that they coordinate to achieve it, or that 
they intend to act together. At the other end of the spectrum of collective 
actions are joint cooperative actions, where agents share the same goal, 
intend to act together, and coordinate their actions to achieve their 
shared goal.
Philosophers have tended to focus on the latter kind of collective 
actions, joint actions for short. Furthermore, their paradigmatic examples 
of joint actions tend to be small-scale, egalitarian joint actions, such as 
two people painting a house together, moving heavy furniture together, 
preparing a sauce together, or walking together. A number of prominent 
philosophers of action have proposed accounts aimed at capturing the 
features in virtue of which actions count as joint action (Gilbert, 1989, 
1990, 2009; Tuomela & Miller, 1988; Tuomela, 2005; Searle, 1990, 1995; 
Bratman, 1992, 1993, 2009a, 2009b; Velleman, 1997). All agree that joint 
actions involve shared intentions (also sometimes called we-intentions, 
collective intentions, or joint intentions) and that a shared intention does 
not reduce to a mere summation of individual intentions, even supple-
mented by mutual beliefs or mutual knowledge. They disagree, however, 
on how best to analyze shared intentions. I will not enter into these 
debates here. Rather, my discussion will focus on Bratman’s influential 
account (Bratman, 1992, 2009a, 2009b), reviewing its assets and pointing 
out some of its limitations.
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Bratman on Shared Intentions
Bratman (1992) first identifies three features of joint actions, or, as he calls 
them in that paper, shared cooperative activities (SCA), that an analysis of 
shared intentions would have to account for:
1. Mutual responsiveness In SCA each participating agent attempts to be responsive 
to the intentions and actions of the other, knowing that the other is attempting to 
be similarly responsive. Each seeks to guide his behavior with an eye to the behavior 
of the other, knowing that the other seeks to do likewise.
2. Commitment to the joint activity In SCA the participants each have an appropriate 
commitment (though perhaps for different reasons) to the joint activity, and their 
mutual responsiveness is in the pursuit of this commitment.
3. Commitment to mutual support In SCA each agent is committed to supporting 
the efforts of the other to play her role in the joint activity.… These com-
mitments to support each other put us in a position to perform the joint activ-
ity successfully even if we each need help in certain ways. (Bratman, 1992, 
p. 328)
None of these three features is by itself sufficient to make an activity 
an SCA, but, according to Bratman, taken together they are characteristic 
of SCAs. Bratman then argues that joint actions can be accounted for in 
terms of shared intentions.
However, how can shared intentions satisfy these requirements? With 
regard to the commitment to a joint activity, Bratman (1992, 2009a, 
2009b) proposes that each of the participating agents should have an 
intention in favor of the joint activity, where to avoid circularity, the 
notion of a joint activity should be read in a cooperatively neutral way. 
Since Bratman construes commitment to a joint activity in a cooperatively 
neutral way, this commitment does not suffice to ensure that the activity 
that follows is an SCA. The originality of Bratman’s analysis comes from 
the way in which he construes the two further features of mutual respon-
siveness and commitment to mutual support. Mutual responsiveness is 
analyzed in terms of interlocking intentions and meshing subplans. For an 
activity to be an SCA, it must be the case that the intentions of the partici-
pants interlock in the sense that each agent intends that the shared activity 
go in part by way of the relevant intentions of each of the other partici-
pants. Furthermore, each must also intend that this shared activity pro-
ceeds by way of subplans of the participants that mesh in the sense that 
they are corealizable.
Bratman analyzes the commitment to mutual support as the rational 
requirement that agents be disposed to help their partners play their role 
if their help is needed and not too costly to them. As a final condition on 
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shared intentions, Bratman requires that there be common knowledge 
among the participating agents of all these conditions.
By conceiving of shared intentions as an interlocking web of intentions 
of individuals, Bratman moves away from the classical reductive analyses 
of collective action since he maintains that the crucial link among the 
attitudes of agents involved in joint action is not a purely cognitive link. 
Mutual belief or mutual knowledge does not suffice to ensure that inten-
tion is shared. What is crucial rather is the specific form of interdependence 
of the individual intentions of the participants.
Bratman’s account is quite illuminating as an analysis of shared inten-
tions for future joint activities of small, egalitarian, adult groups. Yet, it is 
unclear whether it can be generalized to other kinds of joint action. Some 
philosophers (Tollefsen, 2005; Butterfill, 2010) point out that Bratman’s 
analysis presupposes that the participants have robust mind-reading and 
metarepresentational capacities and would not extend easily to the case of 
joint actions performed by young children or animals who lack those 
capacities. For lack of space, I won’t discuss this issue here. Other philoso-
phers (Kutz, 2000) have also expressed doubts that Bratman’s analysis 
retains its plausibility when we turn to more complex cases of joint actions 
involving a high number of participants and/or embedded in institutional 
frameworks with structures of authority. I will consider this issue in the 
next section.
Even as an account of small-scale, egalitarian joint actions, Bratman’s 
account can be seen as incomplete insofar as his focus is on shared inten-
tions regarding future joint actions and, thus, on demands concerning the 
planning of joint actions rather than their execution. He provides illumi-
nating analyses of the kind of attitudes and commitments participating 
agents must form in order to be said to share an intention to perform a 
certain joint action in the future, but he tells us very little about how joint 
actions are actually carried out and what capacities are required for their 
successful execution. Thus, while Bratman rightly insists that SCAs require 
mutual responsiveness not just of intention but also of action, he does 
very little to unpack what responsiveness in action amounts to and what 
capacities it involves. However, if we want get a grip on the phenomenol-
ogy of joint action, we also need to understand how joint actions are able 
to unfold in time.
Until recently the cognitive and neural processes involved in joint 
action were little known. However, in recent years, major advances have 
been made and empirical data from both psychology and neuroscience 
have started to accumulate. Their exploitation may help philosophers 
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extend their analyses beyond the level of distal intentions. In the remain-
der of this section, I will use the DPM model (Pacherie, 2008) as a guide 
for integrating these new empirical data and understanding how the char-
acteristic features of SCAs find expression in the joint actions themselves 
rather than just in the distal intentions that (may) precede them.
In the same way that three different levels of intentions and control 
can be distinguished for individual actions, joint actions can be thought 
to involve a three-tiered hierarchy of intentions and control processes. We 
can call these intentions shared distal intentions (SD-intentions), shared 
proximal intentions (SP-intentions), and, for reasons I will explain shortly, 
not shared but coupled motor intentions (CM-intentions). I now examine 
the characteristics of the intentions involved at each of these three levels 
in turn, with particular attention to the cognitive abilities involved and 
the mechanisms thought to underlie them.
Shared Distal Intentions
Although joint actions can occur on the fly rather than being planned in 
advance and do not always involve SD-intentions, many do. Bratman’s 
account is, I think, quite perspicuous as an account of SD-intentions for 
small-scale, egalitarian actions involving adult participants. Here, I rely on 
his analysis, simply pointing out the main commonalities and differences 
between distal intentions and control for individual action and for joint 
action. In the case of individual D-intentions, the agent (1) represents both 
the overall goal and the whole plan and (2) all he or she represents is to 
be performed by himself or herself. In contrast, in the case of joint actions, 
the participating agents (1′) represent the overall goal yet need not repre-
sent the whole plan but only their own subplans and the meshing parts 
of the subplans of others and (2′) some of what they represent is to be 
performed by others. Both (1) and (1′) are in need of some qualification. 
When I settle on a certain goal, I need not yet have a complete plan for 
achieving that goal, but I commit myself to form a plan that meets means–
end consistency demands. Similarly, as Bratman points out, “I need neither 
know nor seek to know of all your subplans for us to have a shared inten-
tion; nor need we already have arrived at complete, meshing subplans” 
(Bratman, 1993, p. 121). Yet, we are committed to achieving our joint goal 
by way of subplans that mesh and thus are committed to coordinated 
planning.
Thus, the consistency constraints that bear on SD-intentions go beyond 
those on individual D-intentions. In both cases, the agents are expected 
to adjust their means to their ends and their plans to what they believe 
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the world is like as well as to the wider framework of activities and projects 
in which they are also involved. In some cases, individual actions are 
directed at other people rather than at objects, and in planning their 
actions agents may need to take into account the intentions and actions 
of others. For example, the film Enemy at the Gates, where two snipers, a 
Russian and a German, play a game of cat-and-mouse during the Battle of 
Stalingrad, provides a vivid illustration of a sophisticated mutual adjust-
ment of intentions and actions. Although this form of dyadic adjustment 
is also necessary for joint action, it is clearly not sufficient. Obviously, the 
two snipers in the film are not cooperating; theirs is a deadly competition. 
What is furthermore required in the case of joint action is that participat-
ing agents share a goal and understand the combined impact of their 
respective intentions on their joint goal and adjust them accordingly. The 
demand for triadic adjustment of plans thus constitutes a further consis-
tency constraint specific to shared intentions and may be seen as their 
hallmark. Indeed, the minimal cooperative stability Bratman requires for 
shared intention is a distinctive echo on the control side of the triadic 
adjustment demand on the planning side.
Shared Proximal Intentions
The successful performance of joint actions requires not just that partici-
pating agents have a joint goal and meshing subplans that meet the con-
sistency requirements on SD-intentions. It is also necessary that the agents 
be able to anchor these subplans to the situation of action and carry them 
out in a coordinated manner. To understand how this is possible, we 
need to acknowledge at least one further level of shared intentions, SP- 
intentions. So far, philosophers have had very little to say on what 
SP-intentions exactly involve and what cognitive capacities are needed to 
sustain them. Fortunately, psychologists and neuroscientists have recently 
started investigating the abilities needed for successful online coordination 
and the cognitive and neural processes underlying these abilities (Bekker-
ing et al., 2009; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2008; Newman-Norlund et al., 2007a; 
Sebanz et al., 2006a; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009).
I start with a brief characterization of what SP-intentions involve. For 
agents to share a proximal intention, the following should obtain: (1) 
agents each represent their own actions and their predicted consequences 
in the situation at hand (self-predictions), (2) agents each represent the 
actions, goals, motor and proximal intentions of their coagents and their 
consequences (other-predictions), (3) agents each represent how what they 
are doing affects what others are doing and vice-versa and adjust their 
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actions accordingly (dyadic adjustment), (4) agents each have a representa-
tion (which may be only partial) of the hierarchy of situated goals and 
desired states culminating in the overall joint goal (joint action plan), (5) 
agents each predict the joint effects of their own and others’ actions (joint 
predictions), and (6) agents each use joint predictions to monitor progress 
toward the joint goal and decide on their next moves, including moves 
that may involve helping others achieve their contributions to the joint 
goal (triadic adjustment).
Following Sebanz et al. (2006a), we may distinguish three main types 
of abilities on which SP-intentions depend for their formation and opera-
tion. First, to anchor a SD-intention into the situation of action in order 
to generate corresponding SP-intentions, agents need to be able to form 
shared perceptual representations of the situation of action. Second, they 
need to be able to corepresent the actions and proximal intentions of other 
agents as well as their own to make possible dyadic online adjustments. 
Third, they need to be able to integrate the predicted effects of their own 
and others’ actions in relation to the common goal to ensure the possibility 
of triadic online adjustments. Let us examine several mechanisms that 
have been proposed to underlie these abilities.
Several researchers have suggested that joint attention provides a basic 
mechanism for sharing representations of objects and events and thus for 
creating a “perceptual common ground” in joint action (Tomasello, 1995, 
1999; Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007; Tollefsen, 2005; Sebanz et al., 2006a). 
The phenomenon of joint attention involves more than just two people 
attending to the same object or event. At least two additional conditions 
must obtain. First, there must be some causal connection between the two 
subjects’ acts of attending (causal coordination). Second, each subject must 
be aware, in some sense, of the object as an object that is present to both; 
in other words the fact that both are attending to the same object or event 
should be open or mutually manifest (mutual manifestness). Empirical 
evidence indicates that although causal coordination and an understand-
ing of what others are seeing are abilities found in several primate species, 
mutual manifestness and thus actual attention sharing may be unique to 
humans (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007).
Joint attention plays two important roles in SP-intentions. First, the 
joint action plan must be anchored into the situation of action. For that, 
it is necessary that the objects to be acted upon, their location as well as 
the location of possible obstacles, be identified by the coagents and thus 
that they track the same objects and features of the situation and be mutu-
ally aware that they do. Second, once the joint action unfolds, coagents 
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must coordinate their respective actions and, for that, must pay attention 
to what others are doing or about to do. Knowing what others are attend-
ing to in a particular situation provides important cues about their subse-
quent actions. Joint attention would thus play a crucial role in ensuring 
that the meshing of subplans translates into a corresponding meshing of 
actions.
However, for joint actions, elementary or not, to be possible, joint atten-
tion is not enough. It is also necessary that agents be able to corepresent 
the actions, goals, and proximal intentions of other agents as well as their 
own. A number of recent theories—the common coding theory (Prinz, 
1997), the motor simulation theory (Jeannerod, 1997, 2006), and the 
motor resonance theory (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004)—converge on the 
idea that action observation can support the understanding of goals and 
intentions. These theories postulate an interface between perception and 
action such that the perception of an action leads to the activation of a 
corresponding action representation in the observer’s action system. These 
theoretical insights are supported by a wealth of empirical findings. Using 
single-cell recording techniques, Rizzolatti and his coworkers discovered 
that a subpopulation of neurons in the ventral premotor area F5 of macaque 
monkeys is activated both when a monkey executes certain goal-directed 
hand or mouth movements and when it sees similar goal-directed move-
ments performed by conspecifics or by human experimenters (Gallese, 
Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 
1996). The perceptual properties of mirror neurons (MNs, for short) appear 
to “mirror” their motor properties—hence, their name. Brain imaging 
studies provide evidence for the existence of a corresponding “mirror 
system” in humans, a set of brain regions activated both when an agent 
performs an action and when he or she observes actions of the same class 
performed by others (Decety & Grezes, 1999, 2006). The existence of such 
a mirror system in humans is also supported by behavioral experiments 
on motor interference, where observation of a movement is shown to 
degrade the performance of a concurrently executed incongruent move-
ment (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Prinz, 2000; Kilner, Paulignan, & 
Blakemore, 2003).
Investigations of mirroring systems in humans have yielded evidence 
that their activity is involved in the execution and observation of a wider 
class of actions than in nonhuman primates, including intransitive actions 
(Buccino et al., 2001). Brain imaging results also show that mirror regions 
in humans may be associated with imitation and language (Carr et al., 
2003; Fadiga et al., 2002; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Skipper et al., 2005). These 
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findings suggest that mirror systems in humans involve more than just the 
kind of circuitry associated with MNs in monkeys. Rather, circuitry homol-
ogous to that of the macaque appears to be embedded in more extended 
systems within the human brain (Oztop et al., 2006).
Many have claimed that MNs and mirror systems support action under-
standing. However, one can mean rather different things by “action under-
standing,” and it is unlikely that macaque-like MN circuitry and the more 
complex mirror systems in humans support the same forms of action 
understanding. On a modest reading of “action understanding,” motor 
resonance would support action understanding insofar as it would allow 
the observer to retrieve the underlying goal of the observed action. But 
here the notion of goal should be understood in a correspondingly modest 
way, that is, as the immediate motor goal of the action. As pointed out by 
Sebanz et al. (2006a), this could help to establish procedural common 
ground in joint action. By sharing representations of actions and their 
motor goals, agents would be in a position to understand what their coag-
ents are currently doing.
However, as Sebanz et al. (2006a) also remark, to interact successfully 
with others, knowing what they are currently doing may not be sufficient; 
it may also be crucial to be able to predict the outcomes of others’ actions 
and what they are going to do next. There is also evidence that motor reso-
nance supports outcome prediction (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). Indeed, as 
Csibra and Gergely (2007) point out, one way in which it does is rather 
trivial. If motor resonance supports goal attribution and a goal represents 
a state or an event subsequent to the action it belongs to, then goal attri-
bution to not yet completed actions implies, by definition, a specific pre-
diction. This type of prediction is what they call an “action-to-goal” 
prediction. It could be critical for joint actions in which goals are con-
stantly in flux and where success requires that coactors perform comple-
mentary actions in quick succession. The fact that a fair proportion of MNs 
are broadly or logically congruent (Fogassi & Gallese, 2002), responding to 
observed actions similar or causally related rather than identical to the 
performed actions they also code for, suggests that they are relevant for 
complementary action. Indeed, a recent brain imaging study (Newman-
Norlund et al., 2007b) found that the human MN system was more active 
during complementary compared to imitative actions.
A second type of prediction, less trivial and perhaps even more relevant 
to SP-intentions, involves action anticipation. These goal-to-action predic-
tions, as Csibra and Gergely (2007) call them, would allow one to antici-
pate the observed actor’s next actions. Here, however, the notion of a goal 
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cannot be interpreted in the same modest way as in action-to-goal predic-
tions, that is, as simply an elementary motor goal. More complex inferen-
tial work is needed. The observer must take into account the motor goal 
of the perceived action together with contextual factors (the situation in 
which this motor action takes place) in order to first infer the superordinate 
goal toward the satisfaction of which the currently perceived action may 
contribute and then infer what further actions are needed to achieve that 
superordinate goal. Thus, although basic motor resonance and indeed 
individual MNs may support action-to-goal predictions, goal-to-action pre-
diction requires the involvement of more complex processes of teleological 
reasoning. According to Csibra and Gergely (Csibra & Gergely, 1998; 
Gergely & Csibra, 2003), teleological reasoning is based on the assumption 
that agents engage in the most efficient course of action to achieve their 
goal within the situational constraints given—what they call the principle 
of rational action. Thus, when observing an ongoing action, teleological 
reasoning can be used to infer the likely goal of the action by assessing 
what end state would be efficiently brought about by the action given the 
particular situational constraints, or, if the goal is known, to generate an 
action prediction by inferring what the most efficient course of action 
toward the goal state would be in the given situation. As Csibra and 
Gergely point out, teleological reasoning is a very flexible tool in action 
understanding. However, it will lead to legitimate conclusions only if (1) 
the observed actor’s behavior approximates the ideal of efficiency and (2) 
the observer is able to recruit relevant background knowledge about the 
physical constraints of the situation and of the actor. Since biological 
systems tend to conserve energy, condition (1) is likely to hold, and thus 
teleological reasoning is likely to be a computationally viable way of teleo-
logical action understanding (Baker et al., 2006). However, predictions may 
still go wrong if the observer has insufficient knowledge about the con-
straints of the actor or the situation and thus fails to meet condition (2).
If we come back to the insight that we understand an observed action 
by activating a corresponding action representation in the observer’s action 
system and if we accept the idea that human action systems are organized 
hierarchically into three main levels of representation and control, the 
view at which we arrive is the following. The more basic form of action 
understanding involves representing the motor intentions underlying 
observed actions; this understanding recruits the same mechanisms and 
processes that are involved in the formation and control of the observer’s 
own motor intentions, in particular the forward and inverse models that 
operate at the motor level. In contrast, the more demanding form of action 
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understanding we have discussed involves inferring and representing the 
proximal intentions of the observed agent; to do so, it recruits the mecha-
nisms and processes involved at the level of proximal intentions.
Recall that at the level of proximal intentions, action and goal repre-
sentations are more abstract than at the motor level yet are still firmly 
anchored on a particular situation of actions rather than being detached. 
To understand the proximal intentions of others, it is thus not enough 
that one be able to retrieve the immediate motor goal of an observed 
movement; one must also infer its possible significance given further 
information about the situation in which it occurs. Moreover, given that 
even in a single situation there may be a number of different action 
sequences an elementary motor act may be part of, to further narrow down 
the range of possibilities, it may be crucial to identify the features of the 
situation the actor is attending to. Thus, to form reliable representations 
of coagent proximal intentions based on action observation would involve 
not just recruiting for simulation purposes the forward and inverse models 
that operate at the P-level but also filtering input to those simulation pro-
cesses using one’s knowledge of what the coagent is attending to.
Sebanz et al. (2006a) describe another important means to predict 
others’ actions and intentions: task sharing. By knowing what another’s 
task is—that is, knowing the stimulus–response contingencies of that 
task—one can predict what he or she is likely to do. Empirical evidence 
shows that when subjects know these stimulus–response mappings, they 
generate a representation of the appropriate action following stimulus 
presentation but in advance of action observation (Kilner et al., 2004; van 
Schie et al., 2004). Furthermore, a series of recent studies (Sebanz et al., 
2005; Sebanz et al., 2006b, 2007) showed that actors form shared repre-
sentations of tasks quasi-automatically, even when it is more effective to 
ignore one another. Shared representations of tasks as well as shared rep-
resentations of proximal intentions (rather than simply motor intentions) 
thus allow coagents to extend the temporal horizon of their own planning, 
by making it possible for them to anticipate others’ future actions and 
prepare responses to these future actions.
For shared representations of actions and tasks to foster coordination 
rather than create confusion, it is important that agents also be able to 
keep apart representations of their own and of others’ actions and inten-
tions. Unless it is clear who is doing (or preparing to do) what, coagents 
cannot efficiently plan their next moves. Although the exact mechanisms 
through which self–other distinction is achieved are not yet well under-
stood, there is growing brain imaging and clinical evidence that the right 
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parietal cortex and the insula are strongly implicated in this process of 
self–other distinction (Ruby & Decety, 2001; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et 
al., 2003; Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004). In particular, existing data indicate 
that activation in the right inferior parietal lobule is negatively correlated, 
and activation of the insula positively correlated, with self-agency. Since 
both areas are involved in various forms of mapping and integration of 
multimodal information, agency attribution and self–other distinction 
appear to be based on processes of comparison of information from differ-
ent sources, including interoceptive, exteroceptive, and motor feedback 
signals.
I have so far discussed two kinds of abilities successful action depends 
on: the ability to share perceptual representations of the situation of action 
and the ability corepresent the actions and proximal intentions of coagents 
while maintaining a self–other distinction. A third kind of ability is also 
required, which is perhaps the most crucial—namely, the ability to inte-
grate the predicted effects of one’s own and others’ actions in relation to 
the joint goal. Joint attention and corepresentations of others’ actions and 
intentions can support both competitive and cooperative interactions, but 
this third kind of ability is where the difference between cooperation and 
competition lies. Unfortunately, however, this ability is also the least well 
understood. It is, as Knoblich and Sebanz (2008) put it, “critical and 
miraculous at the same time”(p.2025). Some recent neuroimaging studies 
(Newman-Norlund et al., 2007a, 2008) raise the possibility that right infe-
rior frontal activations are related to integration processes; however, other 
interpretations of these activations in terms of inhibition processes are 
possible (Brass et al., 2001; Brass et al., 2005). Since empirical data are still 
scarce, the suggestions I have to offer regarding integration are perforce 
highly speculative.
Bratman (2009a) spells out that requirement at the level of distal inten-
tions in terms of a web of intentions allowing an agent to relate his or her 
own intentions and the intentions of his or her coagents to an intention 
in favor of a joint activity. However, how does that translate at the level 
of proximal intentions, and what form does that intentional structure 
take? For there to be a joint action, coactors have to be able to relate and 
adjust their own actions and the actions of their partners not just to one 
another but to the joint action. This requires that agents be capable of 
explicitly representing the instrumental relation of their and their coag-
ents’ individual actions to the joint action, and this, in turn, requires that 
agents form a detailed representation of their joint goal that carves it, so 
to speak, at its instrumental joints. I therefore propose that the representa-
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tion of the joint goal that agents form at the level of SP-intentions consists 
in a representation of a hierarchy of situated goals. This representation 
would be more specific than the kinds of plans that would be attached to 
SD-intentions insofar as goals are indexed to a specific situation and goals 
and subgoals can be represented more concretely as desired states in that 
situation. Suppose, for instance, our joint goal, as it could be represented 
at the level of SD-intentions, is to rearrange the furniture in the living 
room by inverting the position of the dining space and of the television 
corner. At the level of proximal shared intentions, this goal can be specified 
more concretely as moving this table from here to there, placing the sofa 
along the wall facing the window, and so forth, and from this situated 
representation a hierarchy of subgoals can be derived such as first clearing 
obstacles off the way, unplugging the TV set, and so on. Note that for this 
representation of a hierarchy of situated goals to be shared, coagents 
should jointly attend to the situation. At the same time, this representation 
remains more abstract than representations agents may form of their own 
actions and of those of their coactors since by itself it neither specifies the 
precise means to be employed to achieve the various situated goals and 
subgoals nor who is to do what.
To relate and adjust their own actions and the actions of their partners 
not just to one another but to the joint action, agents should be capable 
of explicitly representing the instrumental relation of their individual 
actions to the situated joint goal structure. This leads to increased demands 
on executive control. Actors need to do more than just keep track of who’s 
doing what and of how what others are doing affects what they themselves 
are doing or are going to do. They must also keep track of how what each 
is doing contributes (or, if their actions are unsuccessful, fails to contribute) 
to the achievement of goals and subgoals within the joint goal hierarchy, 
thus monitoring progress toward the achievement of the overarching joint 
goal and allowing them to plan their next moves, including moves that 
involve helping others achieve their contributions to the joint goal.
When roles have not been distributed in advance, it is important to 
figure out what others can do in order to decide whether or not to take 
care oneself of a given subgoal, let others take charge, or do it together. 
This may involve using prior information one already has about one’s own 
and one’s coagents’ respective skills. In some cases, one may also have to 
exploit online perceptual information. In the example given earlier of 
people rearranging furniture in a room, this would involve taking into 
account the bulk and weight of the various pieces of furniture, as well as 
the location of the coactors relative to various objects: it takes two to move 
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a heavy sofa, but one can move a chair on one’s own, and if we’re moving 
chairs it makes sense for me to take care of the chairs near where I stand 
and for you to take care of the chairs near you. Interestingly, in a series of 
experiments, Richardson and colleagues (Isenhower et al., 2005; Marsh 
et al., 2006; Richardson et al., 2007a) have shown that when acting 
together, people also take into account the motor affordances of their coac-
tors. In these experiments, they paired subjects with different arm spans 
and asked them to lift planks off a conveyor belt. The planks could only 
be touched at their extremities and varied in length such that some could 
be lifted by a single individual and others only by two individuals. The 
planks were presented in ascending, descending, or random order of 
length. The transition between one-person lifting and two-person lifting 
during the ascending and random order tended to occur around the time 
the smaller participant could no longer comfortably lift the planks alone. 
The greater the difference in arm span between the two participants, the 
earlier the transition, suggesting that in deciding what to do the partici-
pants with the longer arms were taking into account the motor affordances 
of their partner.
Coupled Motor Intentions
Finally, for some joint actions to proceed successfully, it is not enough that 
coactors share a representation of a hierarchy of situated goals and con-
verge on the distribution of roles; it is also necessary that their actions be 
very precisely coordinated in time and space. Ballroom dancing or rowing 
are fitting examples. In such cases, we need to appeal not just to SP-
intentions but also to CM-intentions.
There is evidence that basic and unconscious bodily entrainment mech-
anisms may help achieve synchronization. Thus, two people sitting next 
to each other in rocking chairs will unconsciously synchronize their 
rocking frequency and do so even when they have chairs with different 
eigenfrequencies (Richardson et al., 2007b). Similarly, people interacting 
tend to nonconsciously mimic each other’s gestures, postures, and man-
nerisms, and this unconscious mimicry has been shown to enhance the 
smoothness of interactions and foster liking (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 
Such entrainment mechanisms may thus facilitate the formation of CM-
intentions. I have already discussed one way in which motor intentions 
may become effectively coupled: basic motor resonance mechanisms 
involving broadly congruent mirroring allow for “action-to-(motor)-goal” 
prediction and for the automatic activation of complementary actions by 
the observer. More generally, the extent to which motor coupling can be 
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achieved appears to depend on the degree of similarity between the motor 
repertoires of the agents as well as on their level of expertise. Thus, a study 
by Keller et al. (2007) found that pianists duet better when they play with 
themselves, that is, are better at synchronizing with recordings of their 
own past performances than with others’ recordings. This finding seems 
to indicate that tight action coordination and synchronization requires 
that coagents have similar internal models not just at the proximal level 
but also at the motor level.
Note that I speak here of coupled rather than shared motor intentions. 
Here’s why. I insisted earlier that one essential feature of both shared distal 
and proximal intentions is that coagents having these intentions have a 
representation of a joint goal as such in addition to representations of their 
individual intentions and actions and have mechanisms of triadic adjust-
ment with respect to the represented joint goal. I don’t think existing 
empirical evidence allows us to posit the existence of motor representa-
tions of joint goals or of mechanisms of triadic motor adjustment. Rather, 
what we have at this level are simpler mechanisms of dyadic adjustment. 
When the motor intentions of the coagents are embedded within SP-
intentions and placed under their control, thus ensuring that they attend 
to the same aspects of the environment and elicit parallel motor simula-
tions, motor intentions can become coupled so as to promote the joint 
proximal goal. CM-intentions whose coupling is modulated by an SP-
intention would thus mimic shared motor intentions.
In addition, recent studies (Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009) indicate that 
motor synchronization can foster cooperation within groups by strength-
ening group cohesion. Thus, in one of these studies, an experimenter led 
thirty participants in groups of three on walks around campus. In the 
synchronous condition, participants walked in step. In the control condi-
tion, they walked normally. After their walk, participants completed a 
questionnaire designed to convince them that they had finished the exper-
iment. In an ostensibly separate experiment, a second experimenter had 
them play an economic game, the Weak Link Coordination Exercise, where 
different amounts of cooperation and free riding are possible. Participants 
who had walked in step cooperated more than those who had not walked 
in step. Participants in the synchronous condition also indicated stronger 
feelings of connection with and trust in their counterparts than did those 
in the asynchronous condition.
To recap, I have argued in this section that to understand how joint 
actions are able to unfold over time and be successful completed, it is 
not enough to postulate Bratman-like SD-intentions. To account for the 
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successful performance of small-scale joint actions, we need to acknowl-
edge at least one further level of shared intentions, SP- intentions, respon-
sible for online dyadic and triadic adjustments. To account for joint 
actions whose successful performance requires very precise spatiotemporal 
coordination, we also need to acknowledge CM-intentions. SP-intentions 
and CM-intentions are supported by a number of cognitive mechanisms 
and processes, including, for the former, joint attention, motor resonance, 
and teleological reasoning, and, for the latter, bodily entrainment 
mechanisms.
Beyond Small-Scale, Egalitarian Actions
In the previous section, I concentrated on small-scale, egalitarian joint 
actions involving face-to-face interactions. My focus was on what was 
needed, beyond simply SD-intentions, to ensure their successful perfor-
mance. In face-to-face interactions, the coordination of individual actions 
in the pursuit of a joint goal is made possible in large part by various forms 
of exploitation of perceptual information. Thus, joint attention mecha-
nisms use perceptual information to determine what is and what is not 
common perceptual ground among coactors while motor resonance mech-
anisms and teleological reasoning use perceptual information about the 
actions others are performing and about situational constraints to infer 
their goals and future actions and predict their consequences. Yet, if these 
were the only cognitive tools we had at our disposal to promote coordina-
tion, there would be sharp limitations to the kind of joint actions we could 
successfully engage in.
First, since these cognitive tools exploit perceptual information, they 
can be of no help unless a certain amount of common perceptual informa-
tion is indeed available to coactors. Second, even when common percep-
tual information is available, there are limits to our processing capacities. 
An agent may be able to simultaneously track what a small number of 
other agents are currently attending to, but when the number of agents 
and the number of different things they are attending to increase, this 
capacity soon finds its limits. Our capacity to co-represent the actions, 
goals, and proximal intentions of other agents we observe acting encoun-
ters similar limitations. Moreover, understanding of actions through motor 
resonance or mirroring works only to the extent that the observed actions 
are part of the action repertoire of the observer.
Yet, human agents have been able to overcome these limitations. They 
engage in joint actions involving large numbers of coactors. They engage 
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in joint actions where they don’t have common perceptual grounds and 
where interactions are virtual rather than physical. They engage in joint 
actions where they play specialized roles that are not interchangeable. The 
questions I am concerned with in this section are the following. How is 
coordination toward a joint goal achieved in such cases? What cognitive 
capacities does it tap? How should we revise a Bratmanian account of joint 
actions to accommodate these kinds of joint actions?
I start with an exploration of the different kinds of “coordination tools” 
that are involved in these more complex forms of joint action. To do this, 
I discuss at some length the fascinating example of the symphonic orches-
tra. An orchestra playing a symphony is certainly a prime instance of joint 
action. This kind of joint performance has features in common with the 
simpler forms of joint actions we have been concerned with so far: the 
members of the orchestra are in the same physical location, they share a 
fair deal of perceptual ground, and the success of their collective perfor-
mance depends in part on a very tight temporal coordination of their 
respective individual actions. Yet, there are also important disanalogies.
Chief among the features that distinguish the performance of a sym-
phonic work from the performance of simpler joint actions are the numbers 
of agents involved and the complexity of the task they set for themselves. 
A modern symphony orchestra has around eighty to one hundred musi-
cians, playing from ten to over twenty different instruments. A symphonic 
work is a highly complex musical piece where different instruments or 
groups of instruments play different but simultaneous musical “lines” 
whose tempo and dynamics evolve in time. How can the musicians pos-
sibly succeed? What are the coordination tools that make it possible for 
them to hold their performance together? The score, orchestra hierarchy, 
and conductor, as well as ensemble practice and rehearsals, are instances 
of the different classes of coordination tools that make complex joint 
actions possible. Let us now examine the functions of these tools and 
see what they contribute to the various levels of intentions and control 
involved in joint action.
The musical score provides an explicit representation, both material and 
public, of the joint goal and action plan, assigning to each agent his or 
her part in the joint action and providing for each a detailed script of what 
to do. If people had to devise plans from scratch every time they are about 
to engage in joint action, these would be cognitively very costly and time-
consuming, and we most probably would not witness that many perfor-
mances of joint actions. Instead, very often, people rely on preestablished 
scripts, where plans and subplans that mesh are delineated and provide 
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effective blueprints for the coactors. The musical scores used in Western 
classical music are perhaps an extreme case (in part because performing 
the music written on the score is the goal of the joint activity, not a means 
toward some further goal, and in part also because this musical tradition 
puts special emphasis on fidelity to the score and to the intentions of the 
composer), but examples also abound outside the domain of music or of 
the performing arts. Surgical teams in operation theaters have well-estab-
lished procedures where each member of the team knows exactly what he 
or she has to do; the same is true of fire fighters, sailors, and in general of 
most activities where people work as a team. Preestablished scripts thus 
function as ready-made SD-intentions, reducing demands for the negotia-
tion of plans and subplans among coagents.
However, even the most precise scores or scripts cannot anticipate all 
the particulars of the situations where they will be put to use and are not 
so specific that they leave no room for interpretation. But then again, it 
would be cognitively costly and time-consuming if all the participants 
needed, so to speak, to sit around a table and start deliberating as to how 
the script is to be interpreted and adapted to the situation at hand. Having 
a hierarchical organization is a way of curtailing this process. In the orches-
tra, the principal of each section is responsible for making decisions con-
cerning his or her section. For instance, if needed, the principal cellist 
decides on the bowing movements for all the cellists so that, when they 
are playing tutti, they all bow up and down together. Decisions that 
concern the whole orchestra are taken by the conductor. The conductor’s 
job is to interpret the intentions of the composer, which means choosing 
general levels of tempo and volume as well as supervising all the fine 
shading. Thus, the transition from (possibly ready-made) SD-intentions to 
SP-intentions is not entirely up to the individual participants but requires 
decisions to be made at various levels of the orchestra hierarchy.
However, even with all these matters settled and decisions made, precise 
coordination of the whole ensemble is not achieved instantaneously. 
Rather, it is a skill that needs to be honed, and that may only be achieved 
through ensemble practice and rehearsals. Within sections, coordination is 
facilitated by the fact that apart from the principal who may be called to 
play solo parts, musicians usually all play the same part on the same instru-
ment. Indeed, the fact that, within each string section, players use the same 
bowing movements is not just a matter of visual aesthetics. Players in the 
same section are seated together in the orchestra, within sight of one 
another, thus allowing bodily entrainment mechanisms to help achieve 
synchronization.
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When the different instrumental sections rehearse together, the role of 
the conductor becomes crucial. Musicians typically have visual access to 
only a fraction of their fellow players and, depending on their position in 
the orchestra, receive auditory feedback from the joint performance that 
is partial and variously distorted. Think, for instance, of the players seated 
next to the cymbalist! The conductor, in contrast, stands on a podium 
facing the orchestra. He has visual and auditory access to all the musicians 
and all the musicians see him or her. The conductor’s role is that of a 
central coordinator. Leaving aside the finer stylistic aspects of the perfor-
mance, the conductor’s most basic responsibilities involve rhythmic and 
musical coordination as well as the quality and balance of sound. The 
conductor’s job is to ensure that all the members of an orchestra start 
together and stay together, that individual players or sections make their 
musical entrance at the right moment, and that different but simultaneous 
musical “lines” are at the proper volume levels relative to their importance 
and one instrument or group of instruments doesn’t inadvertently drown 
out any others.
The more complex a joint action, the more information is needed to 
keep it on track. This gives rise to the twin problems of information gather-
ing and information processing. How can it be ensured that the coagents 
get access to the information they need to keep their actions on course? 
How can it be ensured that their information-processing load remains 
manageable? The conductor—as well as, to some extent, the hierarchical 
organization of the orchestra—provides an innovative solution to this 
problem, a solution that relies on a new kind of division of labor, new 
ways of communicating information, and new forms of commitments.
First, although, in simple joint action, there can be a division of labor 
in the sense that coagents may be assigned different but complementary 
tasks, they nevertheless all remain equally responsible for mutual respon-
siveness and support with respect to the joint goal and for what I called 
dyadic and triadic adjustments in the previous section. In contrast, the 
division of labor that creates a role for the conductor involves a redistribu-
tion of monitoring and control tasks. Musicians playing a symphony 
together may retain responsibility for local aspects of coordination, but the 
conductor is in charge of global coordination through monitoring and 
controlling all the individual contributions to the joint performance. 
Instead of each doing their part while monitoring what all the others are 
doing and controlling their actions accordingly, the players lighten their 
cognitive load by delegating the monitoring to the conductor and taking 
his or her cues in order to control their actions.
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Second, the information conveyed to the musicians by the conductor 
in order to help them achieve coordination is not the kind of brute 
natural information (perceptual feedback, observation of others’ actions) 
that agents use to coordinate their actions with those of others in simpler 
situations. The role of the conductor does not reduce to simply relaying 
the information that the conductor’s privileged position on the podium 
gives him or her access to. Saying that the conductor is a central monitor 
and controller means that it is the conductor’s responsibility to evaluate 
the information he or she receives, to compare it to the intended joint 
effect as determined by the score and his or her interpretation of it, and 
to give instructions to the musicians to adjust their performance accord-
ingly. To convey those instructions, the conductor relies on a system of 
communicative signals. At least during concerts, these signals cannot be 
verbal, for they would interfere with the musical performance, but the 
communication system used by the conductor is nevertheless in part 
conventional. For instance, the primary function of the right hand 
holding the baton is to beat time, with the downbeat of the hand indicat-
ing the first beat of the bar, and changes in dynamics can be indicated in 
a variety of ways, such as changes in the size of conducting movements, 
upward or downward motion, or leaning toward or away from the 
performers.
In a nutshell, the various coordination tools we just examined help 
reduce the otherwise impossible demands on the cognitive resources of 
agents involved in complex joint action. They do so at each of the three 
levels of action representation and control. At the distal level, preestab-
lished scripts, such as scores, help dispense with long negotiations and 
adjustments of plans and subplans. At the next level, where decisions have 
to be made as to how best to translate distal intentions into proximal ones, 
the existence of a hierarchical organization helps simplify the process of 
decision making, with leaders at various levels of the hierarchy given 
responsibility for decisions. Similarly, at the motor level, various coordina-
tion tools can be used to ensure a proper coupling of the motor behavior 
of agents. The orchestra conductor stands out as a particularly interesting 
object of study, both because the conductor plays important roles at all 
three levels of action representation and control and because he or she 
epitomizes the kind of division of labor emblematic of complex joint 
actions. All complex joint actions involve a degree of separation between 
executive tasks and control and monitoring tasks, not equally distributed 
among participating agents. In the case of the conductor, the separation 
is complete: the conductor doesn’t contribute a sound to the musical per-
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formance but is responsible for monitoring and controlling the perfor-
mance of the whole orchestra.
Finally, it should be noted that the hierarchical organization and new 
form of division of labor typical of complex joint actions transform the 
nature of the commitments taken by the coactors. If two people are paint-
ing a house together, it is reasonable to attribute to each, as proposed in 
Bratman’s account, the intention “that we paint the house together,” for 
their intentions are highly interdependent and both of them are respon-
sible for the planning and meshing of subplans that will ensure the desired 
joint outcome. However, Kutz (2000) points out the following:
It would ring false to attribute to an individual cellist in an orchestra the intention 
that “we play the Eroica” … Rather, it is far more natural to attribute to the cellist 
an intention to perform his or her part in the symphony.… In contrast, we might 
say of a conductor … that [he or she] intends that his or her group perform [the 
Eroica] given his or her ability to influence this total outcome. (p. 23)
In small-scale, egalitarian joint actions, agents are equal contributors to 
the shared intention and joint action. They are all equally involved in the 
choice of the main goal of their joint action, and they are all equally 
responsible for the planning toward that goal and the meshing of subplans. 
The dependence relations between their intentions are symmetrical. In 
particular, according to Bratman’s analysis (Bratman, 2009), agents each 
intend that we J in part because we believe the other so intends; agents 
each believe that their successfully J-ing depends on the persistence of both 
their intentions, and they each believe that the persistence of their own 
intention depends on their continued knowledge of the persistence of the 
other’s intention. The division of labor and hierarchical organization 
typical of complex joint action lead to differential contributions to joint 
activity, some marginal and others crucial, and to asymmetrical depen-
dence relations among agents’ intentions. For instance, musicians in the 
orchestra have very little influence on the choice of the musical works the 
orchestra is to perform, nor are they responsible for the choice of interpre-
tation, or in charge of planning toward securing the group outcome or 
organizing rehearsals. All of those tasks are the responsibility of the con-
ductor, whose planning and action is aimed at the goal that the orchestra 
together perform the musical work he or she has chosen and interpret it 
in the way he or she has decided. These differences suggest that we should 
attribute different types of intentions to the conductor (or more generally 
agents high in the hierarchy) and the orchestra musicians (or agents at 
lower levels of the hierarchy).
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According to Kutz (2000), although the conductor can be attributed an 
intention with respect to producing the total outcome or activity (that we 
play the Eroica) given his crucial role in planning and acting toward this 
total outcome, it would be unwarranted to attribute an intention whose 
scope includes the entire performance to the orchestra musicians whose 
contributions are more marginal. Rather, their planning and action are 
directed toward the goal of performing their roles, and thus we only need 
attribute to them a participatory intention, that is, an intention to do their 
part in the collective act. Kutz’s account entails that the dependence rela-
tions among the intentions of large hierarchical groups will be asymmetri-
cal. The participatory intentions of the orchestra musicians are subsidiary 
to the intentions of the conductor: their intending to practice their instru-
ment’s part in the Eroica, rather than, say, the Pastoral, to play fast or slow, 
or to attend a rehearsal on Friday at 10 a.m. are causally dependent on the 
conductor’s intentions and plans, but the converse does not hold. Their 
respective commitments will also differ. In small-scale egalitarian actions, 
all agents are committed to the joint activity. In contrast, in larger hierar-
chical groups, the conductor (or, more generally, agents high in the hier-
archy) is committed to the joint activity and thus to planning toward the 
whole outcome while the musicians (or, more generally, participants lower 
down the hierarchy) are committed to doing their part in the collective 
activity. In small-scale egalitarian actions, all agents share the same com-
mitments to mutual responsiveness and mutual support. In other words, 
solving coordination problems is their shared responsibility. In larger hier-
archical groups, someone, for example, the conductor, has the responsibil-
ity to resolve coordination problems. For participants lower down the 
hierarchy, the commitments to mutual responsiveness and mutual support 
give way to a commitment to responsiveness to the leader’s indications.
The Sense of Agency for Joint Actions
The discussion that follows is premised on the idea that, as is the case with 
individual actions, the sense of agency we experience for joint action relies 
on a multiplicity of cues related to different levels of action specification 
and control. However, the mechanisms of action specification and control 
involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in 
individual actions. Thus, to understand how the phenomenology of joint 
action might differ from the phenomenology of individual actions, we 
need to take into account the specific requirements that bear on joint 
actions and the constraints these requirements impose on action specifica-
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tion and control processes. In the last two sections, I discussed these 
requirements, in particular the requirements for dyadic and triadic adjust-
ments of intentions and actions among agents, as well as a range of cogni-
tive tools we use to try and meet them.
In an investigation of the phenomenology of joint action, we should 
consider the issue of what factors influence the strength or intensity of the 
sense of agency one experiences when engaged in joint action. However, 
a second issue also arises: what form does the sense of agency take and 
why? That is, to what extent is agency experienced as self-agency or as 
joint agency, and can the sense of joint agency itself take different forms? 
In what follows, I consider both issues in turn. Finally, I consider emotional 
and motivational factors that may further modulate both the strength of 
the sense of agency and the form it takes.
Strength of the Sense of Agency for Joint Actions
In individual actions, the strength of the sense of agency one has for an 
action depends on how good the matches are between the predictions we 
make about outcomes at the three levels of the intentional hierarchy and 
actual outcomes. The same principle of congruence presumably applies for 
joint actions. However, as we saw in the previous two sections, in joint 
actions, prediction becomes a much more complex task. Agents must not 
just predict the consequences of their own actions at all three levels of the 
intention hierarchy (self-predictions), they must also do the same for the 
actions of their coagents (other-predictions), and finally integrate both self- 
and other-predictions to build predictions about the joint consequences of 
their combined actions (joint predictions). The strength of the sense of 
agency for the joint action (and not just one’s part in it) will depend on 
how accurately one is able to make joint predictions, which in turn depends 
on the extent and accuracy of self- and other-predictions and on the 
manner of their integration.
One’s success at making joint predictions depends on a range of cogni-
tive abilities I described in earlier sections but also on the accessibility of 
relevant information. This accessibility in turn depends on the nature of 
the joint action. Factors such as the structure of the joint action, its scale, 
the degree of specialization of roles, and the longevity or transience of the 
collective all affect the availability of relevant information. Let us now 
examine these different factors.
The structure of joint actions can range from the strictly egalitarian, 
where all participating agents have the same degree of influence on the 
joint action and are equally responsible for planning it and controlling 
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its successful execution, to the highly hierarchical, where planning, moni-
toring, and control are responsibilities assigned to agents high in the 
hierarchy. In egalitarian joint actions, the choice of the joint goal and 
the planning and meshing of subplans are all negotiated among the coag-
ents, thus ensuring that they all have a relatively good knowledge of what 
the subplans and tasks of others are and of how they jointly contribute 
to the total outcome. This shared knowledge makes them well prepared 
to make reasonably accurate other- and joint predictions at least at the 
distal level. In contrast, in hierarchical joint actions, the choice of joint 
goals and the planning of the joint action are the concern of agents high 
in the hierarchy. Agents down the hierarchy typically lack detailed knowl-
edge of the overall plans of the tasks of their co-workers. As a result of 
this knowledge asymmetry, agents at the top of the hierarchy, but not 
agents lower down, will be in a good position to make accurate other- and 
joint predictions.
A second important factor is scale. In small-scale joint actions, typically 
taking place in a shared physical environment, agents are in a position to 
monitor what all or most of their coagents are doing or about to do and 
what the consequences of their actions are, and they thus have access to 
the information needed to make accurate proximal other- and joint predic-
tions. In large-scale actions, in contrast, there are too many participants 
for such a comprehensive monitoring to be feasible. Coagents have only 
(very) partial access to what others are doing and to what the joint out-
comes of their actions are. To take an extreme example, think of the Allied 
landing in Normandy in June 1944. The individual soldier crawling on 
Omaha Beach in the midst of gunfire probably had very little inkling of 
what was going on at a broader scale and wasn’t in a position to assess 
whether the landing as a whole was progressing satisfactorily.
A third factor to consider is the distribution of roles. In joint actions 
where participants have near-identical or interchangeable roles, they may 
have the knowledge and motor repertoire needed to precisely represent the 
goals and actions of their coagents and thus be in a position to make 
accurate proximal and motor other- and joint predictions. In joint actions, 
where roles are specialized and highly differentiated, this knowledge may 
be missing. Finally, a fourth factor that may mitigate the effects of highly 
differentiated roles is the stability of the association among coagents. 
Agents forming a long-term collective and used to acting together will 
typically be better able to predict the actions of their coagents and their 
consequences, even when roles are highly differentiated, than members of 
a newly formed collective.
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In a nutshell, then, if the strength of the sense of agency for a joint 
action depends on not just self-prediction but also on other-predictions 
and on the joint predictions resulting from the integration of both self- and 
other-predictions, then participation in small-scale, egalitarian actions, 
with little specialization of roles and a stable group of coagents, is likely 
to yield a stronger sense of agency than first-time participation in a large-
scale, hierarchical joint action with highly differentiated roles. Further-
more, for joint actions of the latter kind, the strength of the sense of agency 
experienced will depends on the position one occupies in the hierarchy. 
The higher up one stands in the hierarchy, the stronger the sense of agency 
one is likely to experience.
One should note, though, that whereas in individual actions prediction 
and control tend to go hand in hand, in joint actions their relationship is 
much less linear. In individual action, agents’ predictions concern the 
consequences of their actions and are used to select actions, control their 
course, and make adjustments to them if needed. The fit between predic-
tion and control is not perfect, and experiences of illusionary control can 
still arise, as shown by Wegner and colleagues (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 
2005; Wegner, 2002, 2005; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004; Wegner 
& Wheatley, 1999), but on the whole accurate predictions tend to be reli-
able indicators that the agent controls the action. Thus, the more accurate 
they are, the stronger the sense of self-agency should be. In joint actions, 
however, the predictions agents need to make pertain not just to the con-
sequences of their own actions but also to the consequences of others’ 
actions and to their combined effects. The extent to which one might be 
able to predict the consequences of others’ actions need not always parallel 
the extent to which one might be able to control their actions. As a result 
of this loosening of the link between prediction and control, joint actions 
leave much more room for spurious experiences of control.
Forms of the Sense of Agency: Self-Agency and Joint Agency
In the passage of McNeill’s book that I quoted in the introduction, he 
describes his feelings marching and drilling on the Texas plain as involving 
both a sense of personal enlargement and a blurring of self-awareness and 
heightening of fellow feeling. His experience seems to have been simulta-
neously one of self-enlargement and of dissolution of the self into the 
collective. While there is no doubt that participation in a joint action can 
indeed yield this dual experience, one shouldn’t hasten to conclude that 
self-enlargement and dissolution of the self in the collective are but the 
two sides of the same coin or, indeed, that one’s experience when engaged 
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in a joint action always takes the form described by McNeill. As I’ll try and 
show later in this section, the fact McNeill had the kind of dual experience 
he describes may be accounted for by certain specific properties of the joint 
action he was participating in, properties that are not shared by all joint 
actions. But first, let me explain why self-enlargement shouldn’t be taken 
as synonymous with self-dissolution.
The sense of self-agency refers to the sense one has that one is the author 
of an action and has control over its production and outcome. Some agents 
can perform actions and bring about effects that others can’t. For instance, 
some people can wiggle their ears or play the piano while others can’t. 
Agents may be able to do things at some stages of their life, like running 
or jumping, that they cannot do at earlier or later stages. Agents may be 
able to do things with the help of instruments that they couldn’t do 
without. Agents may also be able to do things when empowered by rele-
vant institutions that they couldn’t do if not so empowered, like marrying 
couples or hiring new employees. What actions an agent can perform and 
what effects he or she can voluntarily bring about define what we may call 
the scope of the individual’s self-agency, where this scope can vary from 
agent to agent or vary within the same agent according to age, acquired 
skills, available instruments, and institutional empowerments. Self-enlarge-
ment, understood as a widening of the scope of one’s agency, certainly 
need not result in boundary loss. Rather, it appears to involve boundary 
expansion and, indeed, in some instances quite literally so. For example, 
many human and monkey studies have shown that brain representations 
of peripersonal space, that is, the surrounding space encompassing objects 
within reach, is quite plastic and that the use of tools allowing one to reach 
further in space results in a recoding of far space as near (Iriki et al., 1996; 
Farné & Làdavas, 2000).
The scope of the sense of agency should not be confused with its 
strength. The scope of the sense of agency refers to the range of one’s action 
repertoire and, thus, the range of outcomes one can bring about. Its 
strength is linked to how accurately one is able to predict an action’s 
outcome. In individual actions, there is typically a strong correlation 
between the accuracy of one’s predictions and how well one controls the 
action and its outcome. As we saw, things are more complicated in the 
case of joint actions. The important point here, however, is that scope and 
strength are orthogonal dimensions of the sense of agency. An agent could 
in principle be quite limited in the range of actions he or she controls and 
yet predict their consequences with great accuracy and control them well, 
and the converse could also hold.
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In many cases, joint actions allow us to bring about outcomes that a 
single agent could not—or could not easily—bring about on his or her 
own. Rousseau’s stag hunt story, briefly told in A Discourse on Inequality 
(1754), illustrates the benefits of joint action. Two hunters acting together 
can capture a stag, whereas each hunting individually can take only a hare 
apiece, and a stag provides more food than two hares. Acting jointly is 
thus one way of widening the scope of agency. But is agency then experi-
enced as self-agency or joint agency?
What the sense of joint agency encompasses is not easy to capture. 
Here’s a rough attempt. In joint action, agents make their own contribution 
to the joint goal but must also coordinate with others (dyadic adjustments) 
and coordinate with others with respect to the joint goal (triadic adjust-
ments). Contributions to the joint outcome may be important or marginal, 
and coordination relations can be symmetrical or asymmetrical. Roughly, 
then, the sense of joint agency is the sense that one’s contribution to the 
joint outcome is commensurate to the contributions of one’s coagents and 
that one’s coordination relations with coagents are relatively symmetrical. 
Thus, a sense of joint agency will be fostered in situations where individual 
contributions are (perceived as being) of comparable importance and where 
coordination relations are (perceived as) symmetrical.
Other things being equal, participation in egalitarian joint actions is 
more likely to give rise to a sense of joint agency than participation in a 
hierarchically structured action. In hierarchical actions, agents high in the 
hierarchy can have more influence on the joint outcome than agents lower 
down the hierarchy, and coordination relations are highly asymmetrical 
with agents at the top of the hierarchy coordinating while agents down 
the hierarchy are being coordinated. High-ranking agents, on the one 
hand, are likely to experience a sense of personal enlargement, understood 
as an enhanced sense of self-agency rather than a sense of joint agency 
(conductors are famous for their inflated egos!). Low-ranking agents, on 
the other hand, may well experience a shrinking sense of self-agency 
without the compensation of a robust sense of joint agency.
In addition, very small perturbations in the relative salience of coagents 
can influence our perception of the importance of their contribution to 
the joint action. Wegner and Sparrow (2007) discuss results from social 
psychology experiments showing such effects. Thus, a person wearing a 
brightly colored shirt is more likely to be held responsible for the direction 
of a group discussion than someone dressed so as to blend in, even if these 
individuals’ contributions are the same (McArthur & Post, 1977). Similarly, 
the physical perspective from which coactors are seen influences the 
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perceived importance of their contribution. Looking at someone face-on 
rather than looking over the person’s shoulder will incline us to attribute 
to that person a greater responsibility for the action (Taylor & Fiske, 1978). 
Wegner and Sparrow (2007) also report findings from their own experi-
ments showing that small variations in the timing of action and gaze 
appear to influence judgments of authorship for the joint action. Thus, 
when two people are acting together, the person who moves first, be it by 
a split second, will tend to be seen as the leader of this segment of their 
action and will experience greater authorship of it.
We can now return to the issue left pending earlier. The experience of 
joint agency described by McNeill was accompanied by a blurring and dis-
solution of self-awareness. An experience of joint agency may also, however, 
leave intact one’s sense of self-agency. Let us call experiences of joint 
agency that take the first form experiences of we-agency and those that take 
the second experiences of shared agency. When should we expect the expe-
rience of joint agency to take the form of we-agency rather than shared 
agency? To successfully coordinate their actions, coagents have to make 
both self-predictions and other-predictions. The more similar the actions 
coagents perform, the more similar their effects and the more synchronous 
their timing, the greater the similarity of self- and other-predictions will 
be and thus the harder the differentiation of self- and other-agency and 
the preservation of self-boundaries. The situation in which McNeil’s experi-
ence of joint agency took the form of we-agency rather than shared agency 
presented all these features and more. The point of drilling is to get the 
soldiers to perform the very same actions at exactly the same time. To make 
self-differentiation even more difficult, the military also imposes uniform 
dress and hair grooming standards on their soldiers. In many joint actions, 
however, achieving the joint outcome requires coagents to perform coor-
dinated yet different and complementary actions. Thus, in situations 
where the conditions of commensurate contributions and symmetrical 
coordination relations obtain and where, at the same time, coagents have 
differentiated roles, coagents should experience a sense of joint agency 
while preserving a sense of self-agency. In other words, they should enjoy 
a sense of shared agency.
Motivational and Emotional Factors
My focus in this chapter has been on cognitive mechanisms enabling joint 
action and providing cues for joint agency. Beyond the factors we have 
considered so far, another set of factors, motivational and socioemotional 
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factors, may also modulate the strength of one’s sense of agency and the 
mode in which joint agency is experienced.
There is evidence that, all else being equal, agents experience a stronger 
sense of agency for success than for failure and for positively valued than 
for negatively valued outcomes. For instance, several studies have shown 
that people tend to exhibit a self-serving bias in action attribution, taking 
credit for success but denying responsibility for failure (Miller & Ross, 1975; 
Whitley & Frieze, 1985). Consistent with these findings on self-serving 
biases in action attribution, other studies have also shown that subliminal 
priming of success enhances feelings of control in situations where control 
over the outcomes of one’s actions is unclear or authorship is ambiguous 
(Aarts, 2007). It has also been shown that priming outcome information 
relatively far in advance increases experienced agency only when the 
outcome is linked to positive affect signals (Aarts et al., 2009). There is no 
reason to assume that these biases apply only to individual actions. We 
should expect people to experience increased agency or to be more prone 
to exaggerate their contributions to successful joint outcomes or joint 
outcomes they more positively value and to distance themselves from 
negative outcomes. Thus, when the French national team won the Soccer 
World Cup in 1998, more than a million supporters poured onto the 
Champs-Elysées, chanting “We won! We won!”; yet, when eight years later 
the French team lost to Italy in the final, the same supporters stayed at 
home, simply commenting “They lost!”
Beyond motivational and emotional factors common to individual and 
joint actions, there also appear to be factors that are specific to joint action. 
First, experienced agency in joint actions may also be affected by a group-
serving bias, where a group-serving bias is essentially identical to a self-
serving bias except that it takes place between groups rather than individuals 
(Taylor & Doria, 1981). Thus, the sense of joint agency would be enhanced 
when the joint action is successful but diminished in cases of failure. This 
group-serving bias may, in turn, be modulated by the strength of one’s 
sense of affiliation with the group. Strong affiliation to members of the 
group could yield an increased sense of joint agency.
Second, participation in joint action may be intrinsically motivating. 
It has been argued that the difference between human and nonhuman 
joint activities lies not in the ability to read attention and intentions, an 
ability we share with our nearest primate relatives, but in a unique moti-
vation to share psychological states with others, including goals, inten-
tions, attention, and emotional states (Tomasello et al., 2005; Call, 2009). 
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This motivation to share intentionality appears to be manifested very 
early on in development. By twelve to eighteen months, infants are begin-
ning to participate in a variety of joint actions. They are capable of helping 
others and are also apparently very motivated to do so, and they show 
some evidence of coordination of actions (Liszkowski et al., 2006; 
Warneken et al., 2006; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007; Carpenter, 
2009). Moreover, as noted by Warneken et al. (2006) and Carpenter (2009), 
their behavior and emotional reactions strongly suggest that doing things 
together is what motivates these children and that collaborative activity 
is thus for them an end in itself rather than a means to achieve some 
individual goal. If human beings are intrinsically motivated to share inten-
tions and to enter into collaborative activities, participation in a joint 
action should, ceteris paribus, be positively valued in and of itself and 
the experienced agency correspondingly boosted. There is also evidence 
(Marsh et al., 2009; Richardson et al., 2007b) that synchrony and motor 
entrainment lead to greater feelings of connection among coagents, foster-
ing a sense of teamness or, as McNeill (1995) calls it, a heightening of 
fellow feeling. Thus, the preexisting motivation to share intentionality 
and engage in collaborative activities and the affiliative consequences of 
motor coordination may together conspire to bolster a sense of joint 
agency.
Motivational and emotional factors are important modulators of the 
sense of agency for joint actions. If the cognitive cues I discussed in the 
subsections “Strength of the Sense of Agency for Joint Actions” and “Forms 
of the Sense of Agency: Self-Agency and Joint Agency” were the only deter-
minants of the experience of agency in joint action, we should expect a 
second violin in an orchestra to experience as little agency for the joint 
performance of the Eroica as the factory worker on the assembly line for 
the manufacturing of a dishwasher, as both are limited in their capacity 
to predict and control the total outcome of the joint activity in which they 
take part. The musician, however, is probably more likely to attribute high 
positive value to the performance of a great musical work than the factory 
worker to the manufacturing of a household appliance. Moreover, given 
the central role of synchrony in musical performances, the musician is also 
more likely to experience feelings of connectedness with fellow musicians 
than the factory worker with his or her co-workers. Similarly, if only cogni-
tive cues mattered, the soldier subjected to close order drill should have a 
reduced sense of agency and not find the experience exhilarating since, 
apart from low-level motor control, he or she has relinquished control over 
his or her actions to the drill instructor. Yet, for better or worse, participa-
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tion in these highly synchronous joint activities seems to foster a strong 
sense of socioemotional connectedness and we-agency.
Concluding Remarks
While in recent years there has been an explosion of interest among both 
philosophers and cognitive scientists in the phenomenology of individual 
actions, the phenomenology of joint actions remains to this day a largely 
underexplored topic. Yet, progress in our understanding of the cognitive 
and neural mechanisms underlying the sense of agency for individual 
actions as well as progress in our understanding of the cognitive processes 
and neurocognitive mechanisms underpinning joint actions open the road 
for an investigation of this topic. This chapter proposed a foray into this 
new territory.
Research into the sense of agency for individual actions suggests that it 
relies on a variety of cognitive, perceptual, and sensorimotor cues related 
to different levels of action specification and control and that it is governed 
by a principle of congruence between predicted and actual outcomes. This 
exploration of the phenomenology of joint action was guided by the 
assumption that this principle of congruence is also at work in generating 
the sense of agency for joint actions. However, the mechanisms of action 
specification and control involved in joint action are typically more 
complex than those present in individual actions. Thus, to understand 
what cues are exploited in generating a sense of agency for joint action 
and how the phenomenology of joint action might differ from the phe-
nomenology of individual actions, the specific requirements that bear on 
joint actions and the constraints these requirements impose on action 
specification and control processes had to be taken into account.
In the third and fourth sections, I discussed these requirements, in 
particular the requirements for dyadic and triadic adjustments of inten-
tions and actions among agents and the need for other-predictions and 
joint predictions they create, as well as a range of cognitive tools we use 
to try and meet them. I also pointed out important differences between 
small-scale, egalitarian actions where joint-action monitoring and control 
tasks are distributed among coagents and larger-scale, hierarchical joint 
actions where these tasks are centralized, leading to asymmetrical depen-
dence relations among agents’ intentions and actions.
In the fifth section, I explored the implications that the requirements 
bearing on joint actions and the various cognitive means we use to meet 
them have for the sense of agency we experience for joint action. I argued 
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that insofar as the principle of congruence also applies to joint actions, 
the strength of the sense of agency one experiences for a joint action 
(rather than just one’s part in it) depends on the accuracy not just of self-
prediction but also of other-predictions and joint predictions. I further 
argued that the extent and accuracy of these predictions should be higher 
for agents involved in small-scale, egalitarian actions with little specializa-
tion of roles than for agents involved in hierarchical joint action with 
highly differentiated roles, and that for joint actions of the latter kind, it 
should be a function of the position the agent occupies in the hierarchy. 
I also argued that a sense of joint agency should be fostered in situations 
where individual contributions are of comparable importance and where 
coordination relations are symmetrical. I distinguished two modes of the 
sense of joint agency: we-agency, where self-boundaries and sense of self-
agency appear to dissolve into the collective, and shared agency, where 
self-agency and joint agency are articulated rather than fused. I argued that 
what mode the experience of joint agency takes depends on the degree of 
differentiation of roles among coagents and thus on how distinguishable 
self-predictions are from other-predictions.
Finally, I pointed out that motivational and emotional factors may 
influence the sense of agency for joint actions and, indeed, that their influ-
ence may be greater on joint actions than it is on individual action. One 
reason for this is that beyond emotional and motivational factors common 
to both individual and joint actions, there appear to factors that are specific 
to joint action, including prior group affiliation, intrinsic motivation for 
shared intentionality, and the socioemotional consequences of participa-
tion in highly synchronous joint activities. These factors certainly deserve 
more extensive discussion than I was able to offer here. Joint action 
and its phenomenology constitute a domain where cognitive and motiva-
tional factors interact in highly complex ways that we need to better 
understand.
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